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Public-private partnerships offer potentially important opportunities for pro-poor 
agricultural research in developing countries. Yet in the international agricultural research 
community￿and with regard to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) itself￿we see few examples of successful public-private partnerships, and fewer 
examples where such collaborations have contributed to food security, poverty reduction and 
economic growth. This study assesses the opportunities for, and challenges to, creating and 
sustaining public-private partnerships between the international agricultural research centers of 
the CGIAR and leading multinational, research-based agribusiness companies.  
The study hypothesizes that the willingness and ability of public agencies and private 
firms to enter into partnerships are constrained by fundamentally different incentive structures; 
by insufficient minimization of the costs and risks of collaboration; by an inability to overcome 
mutually negative perceptions; by limited use of creative organizational mechanisms that reduce 
competition over key assets and resources; and by insufficient access to information on 
successful partnership models. The study methodology is based on interviews and discussions 
with key stakeholders and a wide review of the literature on public-private partnership. 
Tentative findings suggest that while incentives and perceptions do differ between 
sectors, sufficient common space exists or can be created through incentive structuring to 
facilitate greater partnership. However, both public- and private-sector partners inadequately 
account for and minimize the costs and risks of partnership. Similarly, partners discount the need 
for brokers and third-party actors to manage research collaborations and reduce competition 
between sectors. Finally, partners are operating without sufficient information on existing 
partnership experiences, lessons, and models, potentially contributing to a persistent or widening 
gap between sectors.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that agricultural research can improve the lives of 
poor people in developing countries. Research contributes to the enhancement of agricultural 
productivity, output, and quality; to improvement in sustainable use of natural resources; to 
lower consumer prices for food; and to the accumulation of physical and human capital among 
poor or vulnerable agrarian agents and households. These improvements lead to higher incomes, 
greater food consumption, better nutrition, and favorable changes in the allocation of individual 
and household assets (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2003; Hazell and Haddad 2001). Such changes play 
an important role in improving the livelihoods of small-scale, resource-poor farmers, food-
insecure urban and rural households, and other low-income individuals and households, and in 
stimulating economic growth and development. 
Public-sector institutions account for approximately 94 percent of the $12.1 billion spent 
annually on agricultural research in developing countries during the mid-1990s (Table 1) (Pardey 
and Beintema 2001). Yet during this period, the growth rate of public expenditure on agricultural 
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research slowed dramatically in many developing countries, even declining in sub-Saharan 
Africa. At about the same time, funding for the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR)-supported research centers stagnated in real terms, shifted away from 
research in staple crop improvement, and became increasingly restricted (World Bank 2003). 
Beyond the leading national agricultural research systems (NARS) in the developing world such 
as those of China, India and Brazil, there is little evidence of change in these trends. 
Against this trend, private-sector investment in agricultural research is increasing 
worldwide, accounting for approximately 35 percent of global investment in agricultural research 
and development (R&D), or $11.5 billion per annum during the mid-1990s (Pardey and 
Beintema 2001). Approximately 13 percent of this figure is invested in advanced research in 
agricultural biotechnology by the leading multinational firms and other, smaller biotechnology 
firms (Byerlee and Fischer 2001). However, these resources are rarely invested in research that is 
directly or intentionally pro-poor: the vast majority of private-sector investment in agricultural 
research is directed toward those crops, traits, and technologies that benefit farming in advanced, 
industrialized countries and are profitable enough to guarantee adequate returns on investment in 
research. The few resources diverted to developing countries (either directly or in the form of 
research spillovers) tend to be concentrated in large countries with highly commercialized 
agricultural sectors; therefore the effect of such research on small-scale, resource-poor farmers 




Table 1--Public-and private-sector expenditure on agricultural research, c. 1995
a 
 
Region             Expenditure (1993 US$ PPP)
b      Share of Total Expenditure (%) 
 Public  Private  Total  Public  Private 
        
Developing 11,469  672  12,141 94.5  5.5 
Industrialized 10,215  10,829  21,044  48.5  51.5 
 
Total 21,692  11,511  33,204  65.3  34.7 
 
Source: Pardey and Beintema 2001. 
a Estimated annual average for the period 1994-96. 
b Figures expressed as 
real expenditure, calculated by deflating nominal expenditures in local currency using a 1993 price deflator, and 
converting to U.S. dollars using purchasing power parity exchange rates for 1993. See source for details.  
 
One way of ensuring that pro-poor research programs are maintained and strengthened in 
the face of waning public commitment is through research collaboration, partnership, or other 
forms of interaction between the public and private sectors.  Public-private partnerships, as they 
are referred to throughout this study, are defined as any collaborative effort between the public 
and private sectors in which each sector contributes to the planning, resources, and activities 
needed to accomplish a mutual objective. A relatively new and diverse body of theoretical and 
empirical literature suggests that public-private partnerships are a constructive means of 
enhancing the production of goods, services and technologies that would not otherwise be 
produced by either sector acting alone.  
When structured appropriately, public-private partnerships can generate significant 
benefits for private firms and public institutions while also serving the interests of resource-poor 
or vulnerable households in developing countries. Partnerships can offer private firms access to 
farmers in emerging markets; the chance to wield constructive influence in the development of 
legal and regulatory regimes; opportunities to participate in important local, regional, and global 
forums on pro-poor research; and prospects to improve corporate profiles and reputations. 
Partnerships can provide public agencies access to new, cutting-edge scientific expertise and 
knowledge and technologies held by the private sector; mechanisms for developing, marketing  
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and distributing final products; and financial resources that are otherwise increasingly difficult to 
obtain. Collectively, public-private partnerships improve the capacity of researchers to address 
problems in agriculture that cannot be solved by a single actor, cannot be achieved in a manner 
similar to the relatively rapid, easy gains of the Green Revolution, or require navigation through 
uncharted, country-specific research systems and regulatory environments. 
There is ample evidence to suggest that public-private partnerships are increasingly 
popular in development policy and practice as a means of addressing global issues as diverse as 
health, environment, finance, governance, and agriculture (World Bank 2002; Buse and Walt 
2000b). The international health sector, for example, hosts more than 100 public-private 
partnerships addressing 40 distinct diseases and conditions (IPPPH 2003). These partnerships 
bring together resources and expertise from a wide variety of actors, including international 
organizations, government agencies from developing and industrialized countries, multilateral 
and bilateral donors, philanthropic foundations and non-governmental organizations, and some 
of the largest pharmaceutical and medical research companies in the sector (Ollila 2003; 
UNF/WEF 2003; Buse and Walt 2000a).  
Yet one finds few examples of pro-poor public-private partnerships in the international 
agricultural research community, and fewer still where the expected benefits of partnership have 
materialized. In the CGIAR itself, examples of successful and sustained cooperation are either 
uncommon or undocumented, despite a long-articulated expression of interest and support for 
greater intersectoral collaboration (Leisinger 1995; James 1996; CGIAR 1998). Consequently, 
opportunities are likely being lost for both hunger and poverty reduction and for facilitating 
growth and development in developing countries. Serious concerns and frustrations have been 
voiced within the CGIAR over these forgone opportunities.   
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The rarity of successful partnership examples does not necessarily reflect a lack of 
interest or commitment on the part of either the CGIAR or the private sector. The Third System 
Review of the CGIAR (1998) called for greater partnership with the private sector. A wide 
survey of CGIAR stakeholders conducted by the World Bank (2003) found significant support 
for increased public-private collaboration among CGIAR center director generals, donors, 
representatives of national agricultural research systems, and members of the private sector. 
Moreover, efforts have been made in several forums to promote public-private partnership in 
agricultural research. The CGIAR Private Sector Committee has attempted to address a range of 
issues in agricultural research by providing the system with private-sector perspectives and by 
facilitating new programmatic partnerships (PSC 1999, 2003). The Tlaxcala Statement of 1999, 
an initiative involving several multinational firms, international organizations and CGIAR 
centers, provided a road map toward greater private-sector cooperation and investment in pro-
poor agricultural research. Roundtable meetings convened by the World Bank in 2000 and again 
in 2004 brought its leadership and the CGIAR together with executives of major agribusiness 
companies on issues of research complementarities and coordination. The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and the Department for International Development 
(DfID) in the United Kingdom have been strong proponents and financiers of several public-
private partnership initiatives. The Global Forum on Agricultural Research weighed in on the 
topic during its meetings in Dakar in 2003, as did the World Economic Forum in Davos (GFAR 
2003; WEF 2003a,b,c). Experts from leading agricultural research firms have joined with 
academics and policy researchers to express their views on key topics such as pro-poor research 
collaborations, plant genetic resource management, and intellectual property rights (Leisinger  
 
6
1995; Barry and Horsch 2000; Shear 2000; Richer and Simon 2000). In short, there is no lack of 
interest in public-private partnerships in agricultural research. 
Yet despite the growing popularity of this approach, there are few systematic assessments 
of why real successes have been so limited. Rather than analyze the underlying causes of limited 
success, the literature on public-private partnership offers expert discussions of the benefits of 
partnership, simplistic how-to manuals for planning and implementation, broad policy guidelines 
and frameworks, and glossy write-ups of the few existing partnership successes. Thus, there is a 
need for a more critical and analytical study of why sustained and successful partnerships are so 
few in number, and why, as a result, opportunities for pro-poor research have been missed.  
 
Table 2--R&D spending and sales of leading multinational firms, 2002 
 
Subsidiary/Parent,  









as a Percentage 
of Sales 
      
Syngenta, Switzerland 697  6,197  11.2 
Monsanto, U.S. 527  4,936  10.7 
BASF, Germany 349    4,678  7.5 
Pioneer Hi-bred/Dupont, U.S. 506  4,510  11.2 
Bayer CropScience/Bayer, Germany
a   568  4,462  12.7 
Dow AgroSciences/Dow, U.S. na  2,717  ≥ 10.0 
Grupo Limagrain, France 70  965  7.3 
Savia, Mexico na  611  na 
Advanta, Netherlands 59  398  14.8 
    
Total 2,776  29,474   
Average
b  515 3,275  10.6 
CGIAR Total Expenditure   369 na na 
 
Sources: Corporate, CGIAR annual reports; pers. comm. 
a Includes only sales and R&D expenditure in the 
categories of crop and animal protection, seed and planting materials, food, and nutrition. 
b Averages for 
R&D expenditure and R&D expenditure as a percentage of sales are weighted by sales and adjusted for 
missing values. 
 
Through this study, the International Food Policy Research Institute attempts to treat this 
matter as a policy research issue by assessing the opportunities for, and challenges to, creating  
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and sustaining partnerships between public research agencies and private firms. Specific 
emphasis is placed on the international agricultural research centers of the CGIAR and the 
leading multinational, research-based agribusiness companies (Table 2). Emphasis is also placed 
on research partnerships in the area of agricultural production technologies, although subsequent 
research will expand the scope to include collaborations on the value-added production, 
processing, storage, marketing, and distribution of agricultural products.  
This study begins with the assumption that public-private partnerships are a beneficial 
approach to pro-poor agricultural research, an assumption that has been addressed by prior 
studies on the topic, discussed below. The study proceeds by examining five hypotheses that may 
explain the low willingness and ability of public institutions and private firms to enter into 
partnerships. They are as follows:  
•  Public and private partners are challenged by fundamentally different incentives. 
•  Public and private partners do not adequately account for and minimize the direct and 
hidden costs of a collaborative research investment. 
•  Public and private partners are hindered by persistent negative perceptions of each other. 
•  Public and private partners are constrained by the lack of creative organizational 
mechanisms to reduce intersectoral competition for key assets and resources. 
•  Public and private partners are impeded by the limited availability of information on 
successful working models of partnership. 
 
Tentative findings suggest that while incentives and perceptions do differ between 
sectors, sufficient common space exists or can be created through incentive structuring to 
facilitate greater partnership. However, both public- and private-sector partners inadequately 
account for and minimize the costs and risks of partnership. Similarly, partners discount the need 
for brokers and third-party actors to manage research collaborations and reduce competition  
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between sectors. Finally, public- and private-sector partners are operating without sufficient 
information on existing partnership experiences, lessons, and models, potentially exacerbating 
the gap between sectors.  
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 sets forth a conceptual framework, 
reviewing the literature on public-private partnerships and explaining the study methodology. 
Section 3 examines each of the hypotheses enumerated previously. Section 4 summarizes the 
findings and provides a brief set of policy recommendations. 
  
2.  A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The term public-private partnership covers a wide variety of interactions including 
university-industry research projects, multi-party and multi-sectoral research consortia, local 
development programs between small businesses and government, or large-scale global 
partnership programs. Public-private partnership is defined here as a collaborative effort between 
the public and private sectors in which each sector contributes to the planning, resources, and 
activities needed to accomplish a shared objective. Such a partnership is initiated to pursue 
shared objectives, and depends on complementarities between partners, institutionalized 
structure and support, and the production of scientific knowledge and technology in a manner 
that generates research synergies. A public-private partnership is also defined by the nature of 
the parties engaged in the collaboration. In the strictest terms, a public-private partnership is, in 
the present context, an arrangement entered into between two or more parties, specifically a non-
profit, publicly-funded institution (e.g., CGIAR centers and national agricultural research 
agencies), on the one hand, and a for-profit company (e.g., major multinational, research-based 
agribusiness firms), on the other.   
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THE THEORY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
The literature on public-private partnership is both multidisciplinary and disparate. 
Within the standard neoclassical economics literature, public-private partnerships are the subject 
of traditional welfare analysis, typically evaluated according to the efficiency of their social 
welfare impact given scarce resources for research. Public-private partnerships are also a topic of 
analysis in information economics, where studies focus on the relationships and incentives that 
structure the flow of information between agents (Binenbaum et al. 2003). Further, public-
private partnerships are a topic of increasing investigation in the industrial organization and 
public finance literature, as an alternative structuring of production processes and public support 
to research (Van der Meer 2002). 
In the institutional economics literature, public-private partnerships are viewed as a 
governance strategy designed to minimize transactions costs, or the costs associated with 
forming and sustaining relationships￿contracting, coordinating, and enforcing a relationship￿
between actors engaged in the production of some good or service (Williamson 1975, 1979). The 
magnitude of such transactions costs is determined by the frequency with which public and 
private entities interact, the uncertainty of these transactions and the limits on actors￿ rational 
behavior, and the specificity of assets used in the interactions (Rangan et al. 2003). To the extent 
that partnerships reduce transactions costs and improve the potential for realization of economic 
opportunity, they may be a more beneficial structure of production than, say, market-based 
operations, inter-firm research consortia, or vertical integration of production activities into a 































Source: Hartwich, Janssen, and Tola (2003, 6).  
The innovations system literature 
focuses on the economic and social 
institutions that affect the opportunities for 
science-based innovation within a given social 
or geographic region (Dosi et al. 1988; 
Hartwich et al. 2003). This literature has 
contributed significantly to discussion of 
networks and their effect on the activities and interactions that generate innovation. Moreover, it 
extends discussion from the role of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur and firm to the wider 
importance of social institutions and their interactions with public and private research 
organizations. Central to this approach is the identification of a common interest space (Figure 
1), within which activities follow from objectives shared by both partners (Hartwich et al. 2003). 
Several studies apply the approach to agricultural research partnerships in developing countries 
such as Argentina and India (Ekboir and Parellada 2002; Hall et al. 2002). 
In the development policy and public administration literature, the study of public-private 
partnership represents a recent paradigm shift in organizational thinking. The literature argues 
that public-private partnerships are an optimal policy approach to promoting social and economic 
development that brings together the efficiency, flexibility, and competence of the private sector 
with the accountability, long-term perspective, and social interests of the public sector (Richter 
2003; O￿Looney 1992; Etzioni 1973). While such partnerships blur the classic distinction 
between the public and private sectors in a modern economy, they also enhance the potential for 
both efficient and equitable production and distribution of social benefits (Larkin, 1994). These 
issues receive particular attention in the health and pharmaceutical sectors, where global and  
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regional public-private partnerships are increasingly common (Buse and Walt 2000a,b; Buse and 
Waxman 2001; Lehman 2001; Ollila 2003). 
This is not to say that public-private partnerships are without their detractors and critics. 
An emerging literature challenges the argument that public-private partnerships are 
unequivocally beneficial to society. The most significant criticisms emanate from the health 
sector and highlight issues that include conflicts of interest for institutions such as the World 
Health Organization (Richter 2001, 2003); the ethics of public-private partnership (Roberts et al. 
2000); transparent and accountable governance of partnerships (Buse and Walt 2000a,b); and the 
appropriate roles for civil society, private firms, and public agencies (Buse and Waxman 2001). 
In the agricultural research sector, only a few studies raise similar or analogous issues, such as 
the preservation of the CGIAR￿s germplasm collection for exclusive use in the public interest 
despite attempts to claim patents over derivatives of CGIAR germplasm (see GRAIN 1998, 
2003; Ho 2003a,b). 
METHODS AND TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 
Just as scholars study public-private partnerships from a wide range of perspectives, 
researchers use different methodologies to approach the topic. A particularly useful approach to 
the study of knowledge-intensive sectors such as agricultural research is the identification and 
description of the relations and networks through which information moves between and among 
agents. The meta-modeling of relationships approach used by Binenbaum et al. (2003), for 
instance, dissects the relations between organizations, the incentives that motivate their behavior, 
and the problems associated with those incentives. By reconstructing the relations and incentives 
under alternative scenarios, the analytical output, typically embedded in game theory, develops 
an enhanced perspective on the process by which information flows between organizations. Key  
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elements include analysis of players and their objectives, incentives, and relations; the structure 
and flow of information and the mechanisms that make information flows possible; the choice 
variables and sequence of moves among players; and the relation and incentive problems that 
impede players￿ moves and the flow of information. A similar, more straightforward approach to 
the study of public-private partnerships relies on the identification of dilemmas and tensions 
inherent in the content and process of partnership (De Bruijn and Van der Voort 2002).  
The novelty and situational specificity of public-private partnerships, however, often 
necessitate a less intricate methodological approach that relies on descriptive or comparative 
analysis of agents and their mechanisms of interaction. Studies by Pray (2001), Pray et al. 
(2001), and Huang et al. (2002), among others, describe the evolution and emergence of new 
public-private collaborations and technology-transfer mechanisms in several developing 
countries, their impact on agricultural research, and their wider replicability and applicability to 
research in other countries. Similarly, Michelsen (2003) examines the partnership experiences of 
a single, public agricultural research institution as a means of extracting lessons for successful 
partnering. 
Although these approaches contribute to the study of the dynamics and limits of public-
private partnership, additional tools and methods are required to assess outcomes and impacts. A 
traditional performance measurement approach￿a basic input-output analysis approach, 
augmented by process analysis (throughput analysis)￿offers one means of evaluation (De 
Bruijn and Van der Voort 2002). A multidimensional approach that relies on indicators of the 
values and capacity of partners, their interaction mechanisms and processes, and their impacts on 
objectives, partners, and society provides yet another perspective (Charles and McNulty 1998, 
1999). Of these methods, the most effective are arguably those that place specific emphasis on  
 
13
quantitative and qualitative measures of cost and quality; equity and access; and regulation, 
accountability, and conflicts of interest among partners (Rosenau 1999).  
Finally, the study of public-private partnership is informed by analysis of perceptions 
between partners. Understanding how actors perceive an organization, its capabilities, and its 
incentives is important to developing both short- and long-term strategies for public-private 
partnership. An audit of perceptions and opinions provides information about how key players in 
the public and private sectors view each other, even where they are not engaged in partnerships. 
Buurma and Boselie (2000) use perception analysis to identify the interests, potential for mutual 
benefits, and behavior of stakeholders in the development of an agricultural supply chain. 
Driscoll et al. (1979) use perception analysis to measure the magnitude of persistent negative 
stereotypes held by public- and private-sector managers of each other, even where strong 
similarities in individual responsibilities and characters exist. Sandman et al. (1993, 1998) uses 
perception analysis to examine risk assessment and communication of risk between agents.  
STUDY METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This study draws on each of the methodologies described above, while taking an 
essentially qualitative approach to assessing the challenges to successful public-private 
partnerships in pro-poor agricultural research. Data were gathered from key stakeholders 
through: semi-structured interviews conducted in person or by telephone or email; open-ended 
discussions conducted in person; and formal presentations. A questionnaire was used to provide 
the basic frame of inquiry for the semi-structured interviews (Annex A), while informal 
discussions and presentations were structured by the subjects themselves.  
Key stakeholders are identified as individuals with specific knowledge of or experience 
with public-private partnerships in agricultural research, and include: CGIAR center  
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management and research staff; key executives of private companies; members of the CGIAR 
Private Sector Committee and its recent External Review Panel; members of the international 
donor community; members of non-governmental organizations and philanthropic foundations; 
and policymakers from agricultural research agencies in developing countries. Of approximately 
40 individuals that were identified, and allowing each individual to represent a single 
organization, 26 individuals were contacted for the study.
3  The sample included nine individuals 
from CGIAR centers or programs, nine from the private sector, seven from the CGIAR￿s 
membership/donors, and one from academia. 
The public-private partnerships highlighted by this study are primarily collaborations 
involving CGIAR centers and multinational firms in the area of agricultural production 
technology (Table 3), with an emphasis on agricultural biotechnology. Agricultural 
biotechnology makes up a very small portion of the CGIAR￿s research portfolio (about $25 
million per annum or 7 percent of the CGIAR￿s total 2002 budget) relative to conventional plant 
breeding and other research areas. It is, however, an area where multinational firms can make 
significant contributions in terms of scientific knowledge and technology or marketing and 
distribution, areas that may offer new opportunities for small-scale, resource-poor farmers. Given 
the very small quantity of available documentation on these partnerships, the study is augmented 
by information gathered from published sources on partnerships in the CGIAR, on other 
agricultural research collaborations outside the CGIAR, and on partnerships in the health and 
pharmaceuticals sector. This body of literature includes peer-reviewed journal articles; research 
papers published by CGIAR centers, international organizations, corporations, universities, and 
                                                 
3 Although this study does not take a formal approach to surveying the entire population of stakeholders in public-
private partnerships, an effort is made to obtain information from a nonrandom sample of individuals representing 
.private-sector firms and public-sector agencies who are closely familiar with the topic of this study.  
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non-governmental organizations; and information gleaned from promotional materials and 
websites.  






Private Sector Partners  Other Partners 
Collaborative Research ￿ Global Programs 
Apomixis  CIMMYT  Pioneer Hi-bred (U.S.), 
Syngenta (Switzerland), 
Limagrain (France) 
L￿Institut de RecherchØ pour 
le DØveloppement (France) 
Golden Rice Humanitarian 
Board 
IRRI Syngenta  (Switzerland)  Rockefeller  Foundation 
(U.S.), Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology, and others 
HarvestPlus CIAT, 
IFPRI 
Monsanto (U.S.)   
Wheat Improvement
e  CIMMYT    Grains Research & 
Development Corp. (Aus.) 
Collaborative Research ￿ Local/Regional Programs 
Sorghum and Millet Research
e ICRISAT  Consortium  of  private 
seed companies, incl. 
Monsanto (India), others 
 
Forage Seed Improvement  CIAT  Grupo Papalotla (Mexico)   
Insect Resistant Maize for 
Africa
e 
CIMMYT   Kenyan  Agricultural 









(U.K.), Monsanto (U.S.) 
 
Genomics for Livestock 
Vaccine Research
e 
ILRI  The Institute for Genomic 
Research (U.S.) 
 






Consortium of other public 
research institutions 
Positive Selection Technology 
for Cassava Transformation 
CIAT Novartis
c (Switzerland)   
 
Sources: Various.  
a Now Bayer CropScience.  
b Insolvent as of 1999.   
c Now Syngenta.  
d Subsidiary of Mitsubishi.  
e The definition of a public-private partnership is extended here to include a collaboration between a CGIAR 
center, on the one hand, and a philanthropic organization established by a commercial entity, or an organization 
established to represent industry interests, on the other.   
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3.  RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Tentative findings suggest that, of the five hypotheses presented earlier, the three most 
significant challenges to successful partnership are (a) the lack of creative organizational 
mechanisms to reduce intersectoral competition for key assets and resources; (b) inadequate  
accounting for and minimization of direct and hidden costs; and (c) the limited availability of 
information on successful working models of partnership. While differing incentives and 
perceptions are also a challenge to partnership, findings suggest that sufficient common space 
exists or can be created through incentive structuring to facilitate greater partnership. Each of 
these hypotheses is discussed in detail below. 
CONFLICTING INCENTIVES, OVERLAPPING OBJECTIVES 
The notion of conflicting incentives between the public and private sectors is an oft-cited 
impediment to successful partnership. To be sure, public agencies and private firms are subject to 
very distinct incentives with respect to their research. Profit-maximizing firms invest in research 
where marginal benefits exceed marginal costs, and thus they tend to partner only where 
adequate returns can be readily realized. This often implies that private firms engage in research 
that will potentially result in products￿embodiments of their research￿that appeal to paying 
consumers. Public institutions, on the other hand, are typically mandated to research topics of 
wider social significance with outcomes that possess public goods characteristics 
(nonexcludability and nonrivalry), require longer time horizons to yield results, or cater to end-
users with limited purchasing power or market access.  
Comments from several subjects of this study suggest that these differing incentives are a 
key reason for the limited number of public-private partnerships in agricultural research. A 
multinational firm that develops, markets, and distributes improved planting materials to farmers  
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has little reason to seek partnership with a CGIAR center conducting research with a broad, 
global or regional application. Alternatively, a CGIAR center researching subsistence food crops 
in sub-Saharan Africa has little reason to engage in partnership with a multinational firm whose 
research is entirely oriented to high-value horticulture crops adapted for agro-climatic conditions 
found in Europe or the United States. Given the sectors￿ fundamentally different incentives, there 
would seem limited scope for sustained partnership in pro-poor agricultural research in 
developing countries.  
With the emergence of agricultural biotechnology, however, these distinct sectoral 
incentives are changing. Stronger intellectual property rights regimes are allowing multinational 
firms to develop marketable products (genes, gene constructs and tools of genetic engineering) 
from more basic or strategic research outcomes, products that public agencies would otherwise 
produce for the public domain. Increased recognition of complex, location-specific challenges in 
agriculture has moved CGIAR research into downstream, location-specific applied research, 
while recognition of the comparative advantage in its germplasm collection has led the CGIAR 
toward preservation and characterization of local plant genetic materials.  
These changing roles and incentives suggest opportunities for closer interaction. 
Fundamentally, multinational firms have patented products and processes that CGIAR centers 
can use to advance their research, while CGIAR centers have plant genetic resources, access to 
local knowledge resources, or other asset that firms may find equally valuable. This makes 
claims of conflicting incentives and the absence of common space overstated. Thus, small 
windows of opportunity or intersecting interests do exist, indicating possibilities for constructive 
partnership. What remains to be seen is whether overlapping interests can be readily identified,  
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whether the magnitude of such intersecting interests is significant, and whether policies can be 
developed to increase the opportunities.  
At the same time, the formal or informal rules that shape incentives may generate greater 
pportunities for partnership. In the pharmaceutical sector, the incentives or economic devices 
used to improve the availability of drugs and vaccines offer some insight into the variety of 
options available to the agricultural research sector.  Mechanisms designed to reduce the cost of 
pro-poor R&D (￿push￿ factors) include greater public investment in government research 
agencies and universities; wider tax credits, deductions and exemptions for private research 
firms; business grants or preferential lending terms; and other financial transfers to private sector 
firms (Webber and Kremer 2001). Alternative mechanisms include stronger research exemptions 
for use of intellectual property; working requirements for intellectual property ownership; 
compulsory licensing; or exercising of eminent domain by patenting authorities in industrialized 
countries (Correa 2000; Taylor and Cayford 2003).  Mechanisms designed to create or secure 
markets for pro-poor R&D and increase returns on investment to private firms (￿pull￿ factors) 
include stronger legislation and enforcement of intellectual property rights; tax credits on sales; 
or pre-committed purchases by government, private foundations, or other actors (Webber and 
Kremer 2001).  
In the United States, for example, the proposed Vaccines for the New Millennium Act of 
2001 offered tax credits for pharmaceutical companies engaged in vaccine R&D for malaria, 
tuberculosis, and HIV for developing countries, where R&D is largely dependent on limited 
funding from public agencies, donor governments and international organizations (AVAC 2002). 
In Europe and the United States, tax deductions and other financial benefits worth millions of 




4  Yet in the agricultural research sector, exploration of such push and pull factors 
remain relatively less common. 
And with new incentive structures come new sets of questions. The primary issue in both 
the health and agricultural sectors is whether greater collaboration with the private sector 
increases corporate influence over priority-setting in research. Corporate participation in priority-
setting may steer research toward those problems and technologies that the private sector is most 
familiar with but are not in the public interest. In the health sector, this is a serious topic of 
discussion that includes issues such as pharmaceutical companies￿ influence over World Health 
Organization policy and practice and the corporate strategy of donating￿but not developing￿
cheaper drugs for diseases prevalent in developing countries (Guilloux and Moon 2001).  
In the agricultural research sector, comparable discussions over priority-setting and 
corporate influence are no less real.  The fact that many of the existing public-private 
partnerships focus on a small set of biotechnological events and spillover research, e.g., insect 
resistance conferred by genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), exemplifies 
how research may be emphasizing a technology that, according to some subjects of this study, is 
profitable for private firms but relatively poverty-neutral or irrelevant for small-scale, resource-
poor farmers in developing countries. Thus, some argue that that partnerships must be subject to 
vigilant monitoring and review to ensure that public sector priority-setting in research remains 
uncompromised by the need for financial and intellectual resources from the private sector. 
                                                 
4 In 1999, the top three donors of pharmaceutical products￿Merck, Johnson & Johnson, and Pfizer￿donated more 
than $100 million worth of free drugs and other products. U.S. firms that donate products are entitled to tax 
deductions equal to the cost basis of the donation, although enhanced deductions equaling twice that amount may be 
claimed under certain circumstances. In a study of different programs designed to provide drugs and vaccines to 
developing countries, Guilloux and Moon (2001) find that concessionary pricing and drug-donation approaches 
impose the highest cost on U.S. taxpayers and reward firms with the greatest tax breaks. Options such as differential 
pricing or generic drug purchasing impose the least burden on taxpayers but offer insufficient incentives to firms. 
Ultimately, the study argues that the current system structure militates against those incentives that minimize total 
cost to society.  
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In summary, the fundamental incentives motivating public agencies and private firms 
differ, as do the incentives for engaging in partnership. Nevertheless, common spaces and 
overlapping interests do exist. Both public agencies and private firms share an interest in serving 
emerging agricultural markets in developing countries and finding new applications for their 
research investments, albeit for potentially different clients or different market segments. If more 
effort is made to identify common spaces and overlapping interests, or if incentives are 
structured to promote such identification, then public agencies and private companies may have a 
stronger motive to collaborate.  
HIGH COSTS, LITTLE ACCOUNTING 
Although overlapping objectives are a necessary condition for successful collaboration 
between sectors, they are by no means sufficient. Equally important conditions for successful 
partnership include a feasible research topic; clearly defined project goals; a strategic, well-
planned, time-bound approach; and measurable benchmarks and outcomes. Fulfilling such 
conditions requires the usual prerequisites of a good project: effective governance and 
leadership, accountability and transparency, strong monitoring and evaluation systems, flexibility 
in structure and process, resiliency and durability in crisis, and continuity across changes in 
leadership or objectives.  
To meet these conditions, however, each partner incurs certain costs which, when 
compared with the partnership￿s benefits, affect their willingness and ability to collaborate. Thus, 
a useful way of looking at the challenges to successful partnership is to identify the costs 
involved￿actual outlays as well as transactions costs, opportunity costs, and the costs of 
managing risk and uncertainty￿and the manner in which they are distributed between parties. 
This study finds that partners do not adequately account for or minimize the actual and hidden  
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costs of public-private partnership, making it difficult to determine the rates of return and cost-
benefit ratios of collaborative agricultural research. 
 
Transactions Costs 
Comments from subjects of this study indicate that transactions costs in public-private 
partnerships are often excessively high, a fact common where the collaboration centers around 
the use and exchange of scientific knowledge and technology, and where contracts can be 
relatively difficult to enforce. For public agencies and private firms, transactions costs include 
expenses associated with employing or contracting legal counsel to formulate memoranda of 
understanding, confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements, material transfer agreements, 
licensing agreements for intellectual property use, or other legal documents that set forth the 
terms and conditions of a technology exchange. Other transactions costs are incurred where 
partners operate along different time horizons, at different speeds, or from different 
organizational cultures. These costs include the time required to bring parties to the table to agree 
on mutually acceptable terms and conditions for collaboration or the effort required to adapt to a 
partner￿s way of conducting business. Still other costs accrue from efforts required to obtain 
information about a prospective partner, whether through repeated meetings, casual dialogues or 
background research. These types of costs may be particularly high for public agencies with 
limited experience dealing with the private sector or without in-house or external legal counsel. 
There are several immediate examples of transactions cost and cost management in 
public-private partnerships. Transactions costs are significant in public-private partnerships in 
agricultural research. The Golden Rice Humanitarian Board￿a collaboration that includes 
Syngenta, the International Rice Research Institute and the Rockefeller Foundation, among  
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others￿was formed in part to manage transactions costs arising from efforts to disentangle the 
complex web of intellectual property ownership associated with key technologies, and a lack of 
ex ante good-faith agreements over the use of private-sector intellectual property used by the 
original academic researchers. The Insect-Resistant Maize for Africa project, a collaboration 
between the Syngenta Foundation, the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), and the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), takes a different approach. By 
using only intellectual property (genes and gene constructs) developed by public research 
agencies and available in the public domain, the project minimizes transactions costs associated 
with expending the time, effort and money needed to negotiate licenses for research or eventual 
commercialization with private firms. Collaborative research on virus-resistant sweet potato 
undertaken by Monsanto and KARI, and similar research on virus-resistant papaya by Monsanto, 
Syngenta and the national agricultural research systems in Southeast Asia, minimize transactions 
costs with explicit agreements over intellectual property use and implicit good-faith agreements 
over commercialization to reduce possible entanglements over the distribution of benefits from 
research outputs (Cohen et al. 2000; Shear 2000; ISAAA 2003). Bt rice research undertaken by 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and a consortium of public research institutions 
minimized transactions costs by purchasing a Bt gene directly from Plantech, a Japanese firm, 
while maintaining an option to later buy the gene for commercialization purposes (IRRI 1996). 
Opportunity Costs  
Comments from subjects of this study also indicate that opportunity costs are a 
significant issue in public-private partnerships. Private firms must implicitly choose between 
investing in either research that improves corporate profitability in the shorter term and increases 
returns to shareholders, or pro-poor research collaborations that focus on technologies that have  
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limited commercial value, high levels of uncertainty, or long time horizons. Public agencies must 
similarly choose between research investments that rely on tried-and-tested, in-house research 
and experimental partnerships with private firms about which little may be known. These costs, 
amplified by pressures to engage in intersectoral partnership, make research expenditure 
allocation and priority-setting a difficult task.  
Social planners￿a broad term used to describe agents charged with allocating scarce 
public resources in a given economy￿may also be concerned with the notion of opportunity 
costs. Tax deductions and other incentives for technology donations given in developing 
countries necessarily require the redistribution of resources from taxpayers to corporate entities. 
Yet these types of transfers may reduce the sum total of resources available for welfare-
improving projects, and they may impose costs on those least able to bear them. Furthermore, 
corporate donation programs have several drawbacks: they are often cyclical and unsustainable 
in the long run; restricted in quantity, geography, and duration; and distortionary with respect to 
research incentives, pricing, and rational usage in developing country markets (Guilloux and 
Moon 2001).
5 
Risk Management Costs  
Comments from subjects of this study also suggest that the costs of risk management in 
public-private partnerships are another issue for concern. Such costs are incurred when agents 
undertake measures to minimize the liabilities of potential hazards or adverse occurrences that 
are probabilistic or unknown factors arising from a collaborative research project. Ideally, 
partnerships are designed to reduce and distribute risks associated with a given research problem. 
                                                 
5 Although Guilloux and Moon (2001) study drug-donation programs, their arguments can be extended to the 
donation of agricultural technologies as well. Donations of agricultural technologies to pro-poor research 
partnerships may have distortionary effects if the donation stimulates a shift in research away from more appropriate 
technological alternatives or away from cheaper suppliers of similar technologies.   
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With multiple participants and a greater diversity of funding, public agencies and private firms 
share the costs of a research investment with an unknown outcome, thereby reducing their 
financial liability. Partnerships are an opportunity to spread the costs of such undertakings across 
several actors, each risking a smaller portion of its available resources. 
Yet partnerships themselves are not without risk. The single largest risk to public and 
private partners is the potential misuse or controversial use of a proprietary technology by 
partners, end users, or third parties. This risk of good stewardship presents a wide range of legal, 
financial, and reputational liability to the technology provider￿typically, the private firm￿even 
where recipient partners assume liability and waive corporate responsibility. Moreover, the risk 
is exacerbated in partnerships that engage multiple parties in research, conduct research in 
countries where biosafety regimes are weak, or are subject to a high degree of public scrutiny 
because of the use of controversial technologies. For both the private firm and the public agency, 
the costs of managing such risks can exceed the partnership￿s intended benefits. This becomes a 
particularly important issue as parties to the recently-ratified Cartageæa Protocol seek to develop 
rules and procedures for liability and redress of damages resulting from international movements 
of living modified organisms pursuant to Article 27 of the Protocol.  
Public agencies also face risks in public-private partnerships that are primarily 
reputational. By associating with large multinational interests and controversial technologies, 
public agencies often attract uncomfortable attention and scrutiny from staff and colleagues, 
￿watchdog￿ organizations, the media, or the general public. This situation was made apparent at 
the CGIAR￿s Annual General Meeting in 2002, when the NGO Committee chose to freeze its 
participation because it felt the CGIAR had failed to respond to allegations that genetically  
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modified maize had contaminated maize￿s center of genetic diversity in Mexico (ETC Group 
2002). 
Several organizational forms of public-private partnership offer creative strategies to 
minimize the costs of managing risk. Risk management costs can be reduced through a joint 
venture approach to partnership in which public and private collaborators create a legal entity to 
manage and execute the research. Alternatively, risk management costs can be reduced through a 
￿quasi-corporate￿ approach in which public agencies establish research entities that exhibit 
characteristics of both a public agency and a private firm to promote a public interest research 
agenda (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning 1990). In China, for example, one finds several examples 
of research in agricultural biotechnology being undertaken by commercial ventures spun off 
from public research agencies, often wholly or majority owned by the parent agency (Huang et 
al. 2002; Pray et al. 2002). The revenues generated by the commercial venture strengthen the 
financial sustainability of the vested public agency, while the commercial venture￿s close 
association with a public agency arguably minimizes the venture￿s financial risks. While this 
approach has wider implications for public expenditure and the state￿s role in the economy, it is 
not without precedent in both industrialized and developing countries.  
A more common approach, however, may be the use of an ￿honest broker￿ or a third-
party actor to manage the research and assume responsibility for the use of proprietary 
knowledge and technology. This approach is illustrated by organizations such as the 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) and the African 
Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), discussed in detail below.  However, the ability of 
these intermediaries to manage the risks and associated costs of good stewardship remains 
unknown and untested. Would they be able to withstand the controversy generated by a  
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mishandling incident￿for instance, the entry of Aventis￿s Starlinkﬁ corn into the U.S. food 
supply chain in 2000, which demonstrated how rapidly real and perceived risks can create 
significant liability for corporate technology providers? 
In summary, however, there is still little evidence to suggest that public- and private-
sector partners are adequately accounting for and minimizing the transactions, opportunity and 
risk management costs of partnership. Rather, parties make vague assumptions that short-term 
costs are negligible and can be overcome through durable, long-term collaborations between 
sectors. This may be true to some extent. For example, public agencies and private firms realize 
cost savings with experience gained from navigating the regulatory processes, testing 
procedures, and commercialization requirements of a specific country. This is a particular 
attribute of many partnerships based on the development and commercialization of agricultural 
biotechnology applications. Further, public agencies realize cost savings with access to 
proprietary information about private-sector research into problems that are already proven dead 
ends. This may be the case as the CGIAR expands into crop biofortification research through its 
HarvestPlus Challenge Program, where the private sector￿s relatively larger body of experience 
in the field may help identify or avoid redundant research.  Having said this, however, more 
analysis of costs and savings are required to fully understand the rates of return and cost-benefit 
ratios associated with public-private partnership: a full accounting of the costs of public-private 
partnerships is a critical prerequisite to fully understanding the opportunities for, and challenges 
to, successful collaboration. 
DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS, DIFFERENT REALITIES 
Real and perceived cultural and ideological differences may also affect the willingness 
and ability of public agencies and private firms to enter into partnership. Comments from  
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subjects of this study suggest that individual managers and researchers in the public sector view 
large multinational firms with suspicion, while researchers in such firms view public agencies as 
inefficient and resistant to change. While there may be some truth to these perceptions, they are 
more often unfounded impediments to successful partnership between sectors. Yet there is little 
research on the topic of perceptions in public-private partnership, even despite the felt need for 
greater intersectoral dialogue and scientific interaction. 
What are the origins of this mistrust and suspicion? The confidentiality and nondisclosure 
agreements that accompany many public-private partnerships are a likely source of tension given 
how alien they are to public-sector researchers. These agreements not only prevent public 
researchers from sharing knowledge with colleagues but also generate suspicion among third-
party actors who observe or involve themselves in the public research agenda. For example, the 
secrecy surrounding CIMMYT￿s apomixis research, including the removal from circulation of 
the CIMMYT-based Apomixis Newsletter in 1999, may contribute to misperceptions and 
suspicions of the private sector and of public-private partnerships among some CGIAR 
researchers (GRAIN 2001). Having said that, these attitudes may also result from what some 
subjects of this study regard as an inward-looking, exclusionary attitude common among CGIAR 
centers and researchers. 
In other cases, the origins of misperception may lie in the relative distribution of 
bargaining power between partners. Public agencies may be unwilling to engage private firms 
where the firm can potentially dominate the partnership by virtue of its organizational size, the 
value of its intellectual property, the size of its research budget, or its ability to influence political 
and economic decision-makers. Thus, many of the CGIAR￿s public-private partnerships, for 
example, are not with large multinational firms with advanced biotechnologies to offer, but with  
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small, local companies that seek out center expertise and technologies￿an arrangement that 
places the center in a more opportune bargaining position. Seed projects in the International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), the International Center for 
Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), and CIMMYT, for example, work closely with local companies to 
develop and disseminate improved planting material. Science parks at ICRISAT and CIAT are 
being designed to support local research start-up firms to improve scientific capacity in plant 
breeding and related scientific endeavors. Projects led by the International Service for National 
Agricultural Research (ISNAR) and CIAT are working with local agro-processing firms to 
promote value-added agricultural products for markets. It is reportedly even the case that some 
centers are pursuing collaborations with local subsidiaries of leading multinational firms￿
undertakings that are arguably viable so long as the centers perceive their partners to be small, 
local firms. Such partnerships affirm the center￿s position as the ￿majority￿ partner in the 
collaboration, a position that centers would likely prefer to be in even when dealing with 
multinational firms. 
The origins of misperceptions may also be related to concerns about good stewardship, an 
issue discussed earlier. There is some apprehension among private firms that their public 
counterparts are ill-equipped to undertake the necessary safety precautions to ensure good 
stewardship and manage liabilities associated with advanced, proprietary biotechnologies, 
particularly when operating in countries where biosafety regulations are inadequate. These 
concerns will likely affect the viability of partnerships until such time as the CGIAR can address 
the private sector￿s real and perceived biosafety concerns in the centers￿ laboratories and test 
fields, and in those of their national partners and other parties to collaborative research.  
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Finally, misperceptions may originate from the different ways in which the sectors 
conduct business. Private sector decision-makers are often frustrated by the slow pace at which 
decision making and financial allocations proceed in the public sector. Endless meetings, 
dialogues, workshops, and seminars may prevent those actions from being taken in a timely 
manner to make the best of a new opportunity. Naturally, the public sector￿s more measured 
response to opportunity comes from its responsibility to a wider set of stakeholders within and 
beyond its organizational structure. Nonetheless, the differences in organizational culture do 
affect the willingness and ability of public and private actors to collaborate on important research 
issues, indicating that there may be room for improvement. 
The importance of perceptions also raises the issue of ethics in public-private partnership. 
If partners or observers to a partnership find an aspect of the collaboration in some way 
unethical, then any real or perceived controversy (or even potential for controversy) could 
impede partners from achieving their stated objectives, both singularly and jointly. To avoid this 
possibility, should partners, especially public agencies, have some code of ethics or conduct to 
govern their interactions with other sectors and to ensure that their image benefits from the 
collaboration? Should researchers be asking whether the collaboration is, in fact, ethical, or in 
compliance with some minimum health, environmental or social standards that govern the 
organization, industry, or sector? The health sector continues to struggle with this issue, and the 
World Health Organization has arrived at a policy that keeps it at arm￿s length from tobacco 
companies because of the public health issues created by that industry￿s product (Roberts et al. 
2000; Seoane, pers. comm.). The CGIAR and its centers, however, seem to impose fewer 
restrictions on their partnerships, restrictions that might exclude centers from partnering with 
petroleum, chemical, or tobacco companies (or their charitable foundations) whose products or  
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production processes are at odds with the CGIAR￿s mission. A better understanding of these 
issues and more answers to these questions could affect perceptions of private-sector partners not 
only among CGIAR researchers but among third-party partners and watchdog organizations as 
well. 
To be fair, perceptions are changing. Ideological constraints￿real and perceived￿may 
be of lesser importance as public agencies and private firms identify more common space in 
which to collaborate. At the same time, the CGIAR and several of the larger, more advanced 
NARS of developing countries are building capacity to address legal issues over intellectual 
property rights, biosafety, and good stewardship, thereby improving their capacity to deal with 
the private sector. Moreover, greater effort is being made to mine the goodwill and collegiality 
that exist between the public and private sectors, and the mutual, personal interests in conducting 
research in the public interest. Finally, the mode of intersectoral engagement may also be 
changing from secretive collaboration to more open partnership. With greater intersectoral 
contact and dialogue, perceptions can be improved so that more opportunities for synergistic 
research can be exploited in a manner that is transparent and accountable. 
COMPETITION VERSUS COOPERATION 
The fundamental issue in many of the public-private partnerships in agricultural research 
described here is competition￿over the ownership and use of scientific knowledge and 
technology, over scarce financial resources for research, and over markets, clients, and 
beneficiaries. Competition undermines the willingness and ability of public- and private-sector 
researchers to collaborate on pro-poor research topics too large or complex for a single 
organization to undertake. Overcoming these constraints depends partly on the ability of public  
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and private actors to develop creative arrangements and mechanisms to reduce competition 
between the sectors. 
The primary source of competition between sectors is over the ownership and use of 
scientific knowledge and technology. Although material transfer agreements, licensing 
agreements, and technology donations are standard mechanisms for sharing scientific knowledge 
and technology between sectors and promoting research and the freedom-to-operate principle, 
they are an inadequate means of reducing competition over proprietary knowledge and 
technology, and an insufficient way of addressing the agricultural research challenges facing 
many developing countries. Creative approaches to public-private partnership could provide 
alternative ways of reducing this competition by increasing the ability of partners to establish, 
monitor, and enforce the terms and conditions for intellectual property use and the appropriation 
of benefits.  
Another source of competition exists where public and private assets are inadequately 
mapped to ensure that research complementarities are fully exploited within a partnership. As 
illustrated by Byerlee and Fischer (2001), there is significant complementarity of assets and 
resource held by public agencies and private firms that could benefit pro-poor agricultural 
research (Table 4). However, comments from subjects of this study suggest that there is 
insufficient recognition of these complementarities and inadequate understanding on how to 
distribute the benefits generated by application of these complementarities.  
Looking at the public-private partnerships in which the CGIAR is engaged, it would seem 
that the CGIAR exploits its regional and global network assets to bring together otherwise distant 
and disparate actors. In several biotechnology research partnerships, a CGIAR center brings 
together the local knowledge and infrastructure held by a NARS with the advanced technological  
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capacity of a multinational firm. In other, more product-oriented partnerships, the center brings 
together the distribution and marketing infrastructure of local firms and its own research 
capacity. In the future, some expect that the centers, in partnership with national research 
agencies and private firms, will use their experience, authority, and reputational integrity to 
effect improvements in biosafety regulation and scientific capacity building, key prerequisites for 
private-sector investment in agricultural research. However, the small number of partnerships 
suggests that complementary assets have not been adequately identified or exploited to reduce 
competition between the public and private sectors. 
Table 4--Asset complementarities in agricultural research 
 






•  genes, gene constructs, tools, 
related information resources 
•  biotechnology research capacity  
 
•  access to int￿l markets and 
marketing networks 
•  access to int￿l capital markets 
•  access to philanthropic funding 
•  economies of market size 






•  germplasm collections and 
informational resources 
•  conventional breeding programs 
and infrastructure 
•  applied/adaptive research 
capacity 
 
•  access to regional/global research 
networks 
•  access to bilateral/multilateral 
donor funding 
•  generally strong reputational 
integrity 




•  local/national knowledge and 
materials 
•  conventional breeding programs 
and infrastructure 
•  applied/adaptive research 
capacity 
 
•  seed delivery and dissemination 
programs and infrastructure 
•  generally strong reputational 
integrity 
Local firms  •  local/national knowledge and 
materials 
•  applied/adaptive research 
capacity 








Yet another source of competition exists where the ultimate beneficiaries or end users are 
insufficiently defined or where the benefits of research are inadequately distributed between 
public and private partners. An early example is the failure to reach an agreement over the 
transfer of genes and transformation technology between ICI Seeds (Zeneca) and the Central 
Research Institute for Food Crops in Indonesia due to insufficient intellectual property 
protections (Lewis 2000). This implies the need for negotiated agreements that delineate how 
markets for research outputs are segmented. Again, expanding on Byerlee and Fischer (2001), 
market segmentation may entail placing limits on the use of proprietary technologies or research 
outputs according to  
•  crop or variety￿limiting use to those crops or crop varieties that are produced or 
consumed primarily by small-scale, resource-poor farmers or other vulnerable agents; 
•  locality, country, or region￿limiting use to areas that are predominantly populated by 
small-scale, resource-poor farmers or other vulnerable agents, as determined by income 
level or geographic delineation; or 
•  end-user￿limiting use to crops that are consumed domestically only and not for export. 
 
Several public-private partnerships take this approach. In Kenya, for instance, KARI 
received training and technology from Monsanto to develop virus-resistant sweet potato for use 
only in the region (Cohen et al. 2000; Shear 2000). In Southeast Asia, Zeneca provided genetic 
material to several NARS to develop delayed-ripening traits for papaya but licensed the 
technology for local, non-export use only (Byerlee and Fischer 2001). And after the experience 
with ICI Seeds and CRIFC mentioned above, ABSP and USAID took steps to address 
intellectual property rights as a condition in subsequent public-private partnerships. Still, there is 
little evidence to suggest that new research partnerships have expanded on these types of  
 
34
arrangements or innovated on these terms and conditions to reduce intersectoral competition and 
clear a path for greater collaboration.  
Finally, competition exists where financial resources are so scarce as to affect the 
distribution of negotiating power in a partnership. Part of the problem may be what some 
characterize as a paradox of intersectoral collaboration. In a climate of funding scarcity, a public 
agency may respond to a research problem by excluding other, potentially useful research 
partners if it believes that the partnership will shift attention away from its wider priorities and 
objectives, compromise the agency￿s mandate or mission, or divert resources from actual 
research to managing intersectoral transactions. Rather than identify new sources of knowledge 
and financing, public agencies respond to partnership by looking inward and assuming the full 
spectrum of research responsibilities￿priority-setting, financing and execution.  
This may suggest the need for a separation between research priority-setting and 
financing, on the one hand, and research execution, on the other. An oft-cited solution to this 
problem is the use of third-party brokers or institutions to secure access to proprietary knowledge 
and technology, to absorb some of the costs and liabilities associated with partnership, and to 
manage and supervise research execution (Van der Meer 2002; Byerlee and Fischer 2001). To 
achieve this, the third-party broker must be a competent, independent entity vested with the 
capacity and authority to marshal participation from both sectors and independently negotiate the 
terms and conditions for the research undertaking. This arrangement minimizes the perception in 
public agencies that private companies are competing for resources, a perception that often 
reduces realization of shared research opportunities.  
The arrangement makes for an efficient allocation of management and scientific expertise 
in particularly large or complex research undertakings. Moreover, the approach is, arguably, an  
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application of the principles of subsidiarity, one of the CGIAR￿s main tenets. Subsidiarity holds 
that the primary responsibility for a research activity must be devolved to the lowest-level 
organization within the international agricultural research system￿s hierarchy to ensure that 
activities are carried out most appropriately (CGIAR 1998, 17). It may be a more effective 
approach to public-private partnerships if primary responsibility for research execution is 
devolved to some entity that executes the research.   
There are many constructive examples of third-party brokering of partnerships. Michigan 
State University acted as a contractual intermediary between public and private participants in 
the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Program (ABSP), an undertaking that encompassed 
research projects in several developing countries with funding from USAID (Lewis 2000). The 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications and the African 
Agricultural Technology Foundation were established with the primary purpose of brokering 
public-private collaboration in agricultural research. Already, ISAAA is involved in 
implementation of several agricultural biotechnology projects in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Other third-party organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation are playing a convening and 
financing role for projects such as Golden Rice. Still, there is little independent analysis of the 
role played by these types of organizations, and little evidence to suggest that the use of third-
party brokers is becoming popular in the CGIAR as a means of minimizing competition with the 
private sector. 
An alternative approach to minimizing competition would simply be to dispense with 
partnerships with strictly corporate entities and instead focus on partnerships with private-sector 
￿humanitarian￿ projects or charitable, non-profit extensions of corporate entities. This approach 
might reduce the liabilities to public agencies that come from associating with a multinational  
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firm and may instead bring together institutions with similar mandates and cultures. A 
comparison of the costs and risks associated with CIMMYT￿s partnership with Syngenta (in the 
apomixis research project) and its philanthropic wing, the Syngenta Foundation (in the Insect-
Resistant Maize for Africa project), would shed more light on this issue. 
Potentially, public-private partnerships represent a more effective means of addressing 
large and complex research problems in developing country agriculture because they combine 
intellectual resources with human capital, financial resources, institutional support, and 
complementary, synergistic potential. Yet the gains from cooperation and collaboration depend 
significantly on the ability of public and private actors to develop creative arrangements and 
mechanisms that reduce competition between sectors. 
LIMITED INFORMATION, TOO FEW MODELS 
Despite the many types of public-private interaction￿research collaborations, 
technology transfers, research networks￿there is limited information on the topic available in 
the public domain. And what information does exist is often difficult to access or of limited 
analytical use.  This is particularly true with respect to public-private partnerships in the CGIAR, 
where centers may be reluctant to disclose their partnerships because of continued ambiguity 
over intellectual property rights policy in the CGIAR; the competitive, confidential nature of 
agricultural biotechnology research; and the persistence of public controversy over 
biotechnology. 
 The ISNAR Biotechnology Service may represent the CGIAR￿s most significant effort 
to accumulate and analyze information on agricultural biotechnology research (ISNAR 2003; 
Komen 2000). However, the CGIAR and its private-sector partners have not compiled a detailed 
inventory of their collaborations comparable to, say, the high-quality database maintained by the  
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Initiative for Public-Private Partnerships for Health.
6 The absence of technical discussions of the 
costs and benefits of partnership, as well as their terms and conditions, potentially hinders the 
ability or willingness of public- and private-sector actors to engage in partnerships. Ultimately, 
more information on working models is needed, including information on different approaches to 
specific research topics, to sharing scientific knowledge and technology, to intellectual property 
rights management and use, and to different types of partners (Annex B). 
Yet several subjects of this study expressed a concern that, in conjunction with such an 
inventory, the CGIAR will seek to improve the environment for public-private partnership by 
developing rigorous guidelines, frameworks, and directives to govern such interactions. 
Realistically, the impact of this approach is limited, especially if they are developed in a top-
down manner.
7 Moreover, guidelines and frameworks are by and large irrelevant to potential 
partners in the private sector, where organizational culture is more geared toward a ￿get things 
done￿ approach to decision making. In other words, the situational specificity of public-private 
partnership opportunities renders guidelines and frameworks of little practical use to CGIAR 




                                                 
6 Despite the growing popularity of public-private partnerships, there are few efforts to inventory or detail 
collaborations in a given sector. This issue figures prominently in a study of the relationship between U.S. 
universities and private sector research firms (Ervin et al., 2003).  In the health sector, the Initiative on Public-
Private Partnerships for Health (IPPPH) represents a key informational resource on collaborations on neglected 
health problems in high disease-burden countries. Through events, publications and its internet portal, IPPPH 
provides news, analysis and data on public-private partnerships. One of the initiative￿s innovations includes a 
database that serves as a central source for updated and strategic information on partnerships. The database profiles 
90 public-private partnerships, and includes information on disease/condition, approach, product/service, location, 




4.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although information on public-private partnerships in agricultural research is difficult to 
access, shrouded in secrecy, or the subject of extensive controversy, this study attempts to assess 
the opportunities for, and challenges to, creating and sustaining partnerships between the CGIAR 
and the leading multinational research firms. Based on the preceding discussion, we tentatively 
conclude that public-private partnerships are significantly constrained by insufficient accounting 
of the actual and hidden costs of partnership; persistent negative perceptions across sectors; 
undue competition over financial and intellectual resources; and a lack of working models from 
which to draw lessons and experiences. Despite these constraints, however, there is reason to 
believe that sufficient common space exists to create greater opportunities for public-private 
partnership in pro-poor agricultural research.  
More research and analysis is needed to identify solutions to these problems, and more 
discussion is needed to better understand the ground realities associated with their 
implementation. To this end, several steps can be taken at the present time to create an 
environment more conducive to public-private partnership. They are as follows. 
 
1.  Compile and maintain an analytical inventory/database of public-private partnerships in 
the CGIAR and, more generally, in national agricultural research systems of developing 
countries from which lessons may be learned.  
2.  Identify feasible research problems and opportunities that require research inputs from 
both the public and private sectors and are immediately relevant to small-scale, resource-
poor farmers and other vulnerable agents in developing countries. 
3.  Increase the frequency and technicality of dialogue between the sectors to reduce 
negative perceptions and foster understanding of potential research opportunities, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 An exception to this is in the area of intellectual property rights, where interviewees indicated that the CGIAR 
needs a more coherent strategy and stronger guidelines on intellectual property rights at the system level.   
 
39
make the dialogues attractive and constructive forums for decision-makers from both 
sectors. 
4.  Improve the quality of cost-benefit analysis of partnerships and make available 
information on terms and conditions used in agreements to manage risk and liability. 
5.  Explore the creative use of third-party brokers and other mechanisms to separate research 
priority-setting and financing from research execution. 
6.  Engage in a multi-stakeholder discussion on public-private partnerships and agricultural 
biotechnology research with a wider audience, even despite the implications of 
controversy and conflict that such interactions may entail. 
 
If public- and private-sector actors are willing and able to take these steps, both may 
realize the potentially significant benefits of greater intersectoral collaboration, including 
improved access to scientific and financial resources, new synergies in research, access to new 
and emerging markets, and greater capacity to solve problems that cannot be addressed by a 
single actor.  Most important, greater public-private partnership may contribute to the 
improvement of livelihoods for small-scale, resource-poor farmers, food-insecure urban and rural 
households, and other vulnerable individuals and households in developing countries. 
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The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) is conducting research on the challenges to 
creating and sustaining research partnerships between the private sector and the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).  
 
In the first phase of this research, we are conducting interviews with individuals such as yourself to learn 
about your experiences with public-private partnerships. In this context, public-private partnerships are 
defined as a sustained, collaborative effort between the public and private sectors in which each 
contributes to the planning and resources needed to accomplish a mutual objective. 
 
While there have been many efforts to form partnership between the CGIAR and the private sector, 
examples of successful and sustained cooperation are few. Consequently, opportunities may have been 
lost both for poverty reduction and for facilitating market-based development in low-income countries. 
This is a source of great concern to IFPRI, and a problem it intends to treat as a policy research issue. 
 
Thus, we are interested in learning about your views on public-private partnerships. Specifically, we are 
interested in learning about missed opportunities for collaboration between the CGIAR and private 
companies that could have significantly benefited agricultural development and poverty reduction in 
developing countries.  
 
The attached set of questions (along with this cover) is designed to elicit your interest in these issues. If 
you feel that you can provide us with useful input, please notify David J. Spielman 
(d.spielman@cgiar.org, 202-862-5695) or Klaus von Grebmer (k.vongrebmer@cgiar.org, 202-862-5611) 
so we may discuss these issues with you by telephone at a mutually convenient time.  
 
It is our hope to take just 15 minutes of your time to cover the important issues as you see them. If, 




Klaus von Grebmer        David J. Spielman 
Director, Communications Division    Project Manager, Public-Private Partnerships 
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Interview Questions on Public-Private Partnerships 
 
1. Are you aware of any partnerships between the public and private sectors that were important, 
but did not happen?  
 
2. If so, please describe the topic of the (foregone) partnership, i.e., what partners could have 
been involved, and what technologies, crops, regions, or target groups were being explored.  
 
3. Please describe why the partnership did not materialize, i.e., what were the major problems for 
your organization? (e.g., communication with partner organization, negotiating use of 
proprietary knowledge, agreeing to legal provisions, etc.) 
 
4. Briefly describe what motivated your organization￿s interest in the partnership, i.e., what were 
the major benefits or outcomes from the partnership for your organization? (e.g., a new 
technology, training and scientific capacity improvement, new tools and equipment, 
enhancement of organizational image, etc.) 
 
5. Please describe your impressions of the (public/private) by answering the following questions.  
 
a. The (public/private) sector is a scientifically able and competent partner. 
 
1   2   3   4   5 
 (strongly agree)     (agree)    (don￿t know)    (disagree)   (strongly disagree) 
 
 
b. The (public/private) sector is a trustworthy partner. 
 
1   2   3   4   5 





ANNEX B: PROPOSED SURVEY ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
1. Project Name: 
 




4. Location(s) of Activities:   
 
5. Public Sector Participants (name, country of origin, status): 
 
6. Private Sector Participants (name, country of origin, status): 
 
7. Other Participants (name, country of origin, status): 
 
8. Project Objectives (describe): 
 
9. Legal Status (choose one):  
a. Public Sector Host   
b. Private Sector Host  
c. Non-Profit Host    
d. Independent Legal Status  
e.  Other     
 
10. Project Approach (choose all that apply): 
a. Basic/Strategic Research ￿    
b. Product Development ￿     
c. Access Improvement ￿     
d. Coordination Mechanism ￿    
e. Capacity Strengthening ￿     
f. Safety, Regulatory Assurance ￿   
 
11. Outcomes (Actual/Expected) (choose all that apply): 
 
a. Input Technology ￿    
b. Output Technology ￿ 
c. Service/Extension ￿     
d. Data and Information ￿   
e. Other ￿      
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12. Public Sector Financing: 
a. source 
b. duration   
c. status   
d. amount     
e. conditions (if any) 
 
13. Private Sector Financing: 
a. source 
b. duration   
c. status   
d. amount     
e. conditions (if any) 
 
14. Other Financing: 
a. source 
b. duration   
c. status   
d. amount     
e. conditions (if any) 
 
15. Management and Execution Structure: 
 
16. Governance and Supervision System: 
 
17. Provisions for Monitoring & Evaluation: 
 
18. Key Terms and Conditions of Partnership: 
 
19. Technology Transfers (description, use, ownership): 
 
20. Terms of Technology Use: 
 
21. Key Provisions for Risk and Liability Management: 
 
22. Agreements on Distribution of Benefits: 
 
23. Legal Agreements in Effect: 
a. Memorandum of Understanding ￿ 
b. Material Transfer Agreements ￿ 
c. License for Research Use ￿ 
d. License for Commercialization ￿ 
e. Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure ￿ 
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